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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024(i) (1)
- Intelligence Sources and
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Argentina

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET

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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WNINTEL--

DIST : 5 JULY 1983

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: SERIOUS CONCERN WITHIN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND AMONG
SENIOR OFFICERS OVER THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KILLING
OF TWO SUBVERSIVES; CLAIM THAT THE CASE WILL BE TURNED
OVER TO A MILITARY COURT

EO25x1

SUMMARY: THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND SENIOR OFFICERS ARE SERIOUSLY
CONCERNED OVER THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION INTO THE KILLING OF TWO
SUBVERSIVES. THE ARMY HAS ALREADY DECIDED
THAT THE CASE WILL BE TAKEN OUT OF THE HANDS OF A CIVILIAN JUDGE

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AND TURNED OVER TO A MILITARY COURT. THIS AND RELATED SUBJECTS WERE DISCUSSED BY THE MILITARY JUNTA ON 23 JUNE, AND THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY REPORTEDLY DEFUSED A CALL FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE PRESIDENT. SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS AND RIGHT-WING CIVILIANS ARE ALSO CONCERNED BUT DO NOT APPEAR PANICKED THAT THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION WILL LEAD TO A BROAD INVESTIGATION OF ACTIVITIES DURING THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION.

TEXT: 1.

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CONTINUING TURMOIL WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP OVER THE PUBLIC INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATHS OF OSVALDO ~~(CAMEBIASSO))~~ AND EDUARDO ~~((PEREYRA)) ROSSI~~. COMMENT: BACKGROUND ON THIS INVESTIGATION, INCLUDING THE DETENTION OF THE THREE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICEMEN WHO CLAIM TO HAVE KILLED THEM IN THE LINE OF DUTY,

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3.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THE LEADERSHIP OF THE ARMED FORCES DID NOT HAVE THE
UNITY OR THE POWER NECESSARY TO CHANGE THE COURSE OF THE EVENTS TAKING
PLACE IN THE COUNTRY.

4.

Argentina

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] GENERAL CRISTINO
(NICOLAIDES) COMMANDER OF THE ARMY, HAD NOT KNOWN IN ADVANCE
THAT GENERAL FERNANDO EXEQUIEL (VERPLAETSEN), COMMANDER OF THE
BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE, WOULD MAKE A MAJOR PUBLIC SPEECH,
PROCLAIMING THE INNOCENCE OF THE THREE POLICEMEN AND STRONGLY
CRITICIZING THOSE WHO WERE TRYING TO INVESTIGATE THEIR ACTIONS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ONCE VERPLAETSEN HAD MADE THOSE STATEMENTS, NICOLAIDES HAD
NO CHOICE BUT TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT THEM, DESPITE THE HIGH POLITICAL COST,
BECAUSE THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD HAVE BEEN NICOLAIDES' REMOVAL AS
COMMANDER OF THE ARMY.

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5. [REDACTED] THE ORDER TO KILL CAMBIASSO AND PEREYRA
HAD BEEN GIVEN WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL JUAN CARLOS ((TRIMARCO)),
COMMANDER OF THE I CORPS (BUENOS AIRES), WHO HAS OPERATION CONTROL
OF THE BUENOS AIRES PROVINCIAL POLICE. [REDACTED] THE ONLY
WAY IN WHICH THE ARMY COULD RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE *Argentina*
INVESTIGATION WOULD BE FOR THE CASE TO BE TRANSFERRED TO A MILITARY
COURT. [REDACTED] THE ARMY LEADERSHIP HAD ALREADY DECIDED
THIS WILL BE DONE.

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6. [REDACTED] COMMENTS:

A. THERE ARE TWO WAYS IN WHICH JURISDICTION OVER THE
INVESTIGATION COULD BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE CIVILIAN COURT TO A MILITARY
COURT; EITHER WOULD REQUIRE THAT THE DEFENSE PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT
THE POLICEMEN WERE ACTING UNDER ORDERS FROM THE MILITARY.

1) THE JUDGE IN THE CASE COULD DETERMINE THAT THE
CIVILIAN JUDICIAL SYSTEM IS NOT COMPETENT TO HANDLE THE MATTER
BECAUSE IT INVOLVES MILITARY ACTIVITIES THAT MUST BE JUDGED IN A
MILITARY COURT.

2) IF THE JUDGE SHOULD DECLINE TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION,

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THE DEFENSE LAWYER COULD REQUEST THE JUDGE TO HAVE THE SUPREME COURT DETERMINE WHETHER THE CIVILIAN COURT IS COMPETENT TO HANDLE THE CASE. ONCE SUCH A REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE, THE CIVILIAN JUDGE

HEARING THE CASE IS LEAGALLY REQUIRED TO PRESENT THE EVIDENCE PROVIDED BY THE LAWYER TO THE SUPREME COURT AND TO REQUEST THE SUPREME COURT TO DETERMINE WHICH COURT SHOULD HEAR THE CASE. THE PROCESS OF PRESENTING THE PETITION TO THE SUPREME COURT AND RECEIVING ITS DECISION NORMALLY TAKES ABOUT 15 DAYS.

Argentina

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THE SUPREME COURT -

IF IT WERE PETITIONED - WOULD DETERMINE THAT THE CASE SHOULD BE HANDLED IN A MILITARY COURT.)

THE MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA HELD A VERY TENSE AND CONFRONTATIONAL MEETING ON 23 JUNE. DURING THE MEETING, BRIGADIER AUGUSTO JORGE

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((HUGHES)), COMMANDER OF THE AIR FORCE, SEVERELY CRITICIZED THE POWER VACUUM THAT IS MAKING THE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP FOLLOW ALONG AFTER DEVELOPMENTS, RATHER THAN SHAPE THEM; HUGHES QUESTIONED THE LACK OF CONSISTENCY WITHIN THE CABINET, AND HE CALLED FOR THE RESIGNATIONS OF PRESIDENT REYNALDO ((BIGNONE)) AND MINISTER OF INTERIOR LLAMIL ((RESTON)). NICOLAIDES DEFENDED THE PRESIDENT AND QUESTIONED THE REASONING BEHIND THE REQUEST FOR HIS REMOVAL AND THAT OF THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, WHICH CONTROLS THE CIVILIAN COURTS, AND ANTI-SUBVERSIVE OPERATIONS THAT ARE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE ARMY.

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9. CONVERSATIONS IN LATE JUNE WITH SENIOR OFFICERS OF THE THREE MILITARY SERVICES AND THE FEDERAL POLICE REVEALED THAT EVERYONE WAS TALKING ABOUT THE INVESTIGATION AND THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE THREE POLICEMEN SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR TAKING AN ACTION

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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
THAT EVERYONE ASSUMES WAS ORDERED BY SUPERIOR AUTHORITY. DESPITE THIS
WIDE DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT, THERE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE ANY SENSE
OF PANIC AMONG THOSE MILITARY OFFICERS OR ANY APPARENT FEAR THAT
THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF A BROAD INVESTIGATION OF ACTIVITIES DURING

THE WAR AGAINST SUBVERSION. THERE WAS NO TALK OF A COUP THAT WOULD
BE DESIGNED TO STOP THE INVESTIGATION AND/OR PREVENT THE GOVERNMENT
FROM BEING TURNED OVER TO CIVILIANS. THIS SAME ABSENCE OF A SENSE
OF PANIC WAS NOTED AMONG RIGHT-WING CIVILIANS, INCLUDING THOSE WHO
PLAYED A PARAMILITARY ROLE IN CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES DURING THE
ANTI-SUBVERSIVE WAR.



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
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FOIA(b) (3) - 50 USC 3024 (1) (1) -
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DIST: 18 JUNE 1983

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: ABSENCE OF INDICATIONS OF A SIGNIFICANT RISE IN
TERRORISM IN THE NEAR FUTURE

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2. AS OF MID-JUNE 1983,

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[REDACTED]
NO INDICATIONS THAT THERE WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT RISE IN TERRORISM
IN THE NEAR FUTURE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] POTENTIAL TERRORISTS WERE WAITING TO SEE THE
OUTCOME OF THE 30 OCTOBER NATIONAL ELECTIONS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NO EVIDENCE OF ANY TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OTHER
THAN THOSE REPORTED IN THE ARGENTINE PRESS.

EO25x1

4. AS OF MID-JUNE, [REDACTED]

NOT ANTICIPATE A SIGNIFICANT RENEWAL OF TERRORISM IN THE NEAR FUTURE.
THERE WERE INDICATIONS THAT SOME MONTONEROS HAD RETURNED TO ARGENTINA,
BUT THEY APPEARED TO BE DEVOTING THEIR TIME TO INFILTRATING THE LEFT
WING OF THE PERONIST PARTY; THEY DID NOT APPEAR TO BE REESTABLISHING
THE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RENEWED TERRORIST ATTACKS.

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5.

COMMENT:

DID NOT EXPECT

RENEWED TERRORISM IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.

DOES

NOT FORSEE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE TERRORIST SITUATION FOR AT LEAST A
YEAR.)

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET-~~INTEL~~~~ - [REDACTED]

DIST: 14 JUNE 1983

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA [REDACTED]

SUBJ: DETENTION OF POSSIBLE [REDACTED] ESPIONAGE AGENT WITHIN THE
ARGENTINE FOREIGN MINISTRY

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2. DURING THE FIRST WEEK IN JUNE 1983, [REDACTED]

PAGE 3

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AN EMPLOYEE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER OF THE ARGENTINE FOREIGN
MINISTRY, WAS DETAINED AS HE LEFT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BUILDING
WITH PHOTOCOPIES OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ON THE BEAGLE CHANNEL
NEGOTIATIONS AND ON DISARMAMENT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

WAS THEN PLACED AT THE DISPOSITION OF A FEDERAL JUDGE. AMONG FOREIGN
MINISTRY PERSONNEL, SPECULATION ON HIS MOTIVATION FOR COLLECTING
THE MATERIAL RANGED FROM THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WAS A [REDACTED]
ESPIONAGE AGENT TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WAS WORKING FOR AN
ARGENTINE PUBLICATION TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT HIS POOR FINANCIAL
SITUATION HAD LED HIM TO FALL UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ARGENTINE
LEFTIST EXTREMISTS.

E025x1

[REDACTED]

4. ON 3 JUNE, [REDACTED] WAS DETAINED ON SUSPICION OF
ESPIONAGE. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

PAGE 4

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WNS:ZIEL

[REDACTED] MUST HAVE BEEN SPYING

[REDACTED] BECAUSE OF HIS SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE BEAGLE CHANNEL
NEGOTIATIONS.)

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: PERSONNEL OF THE COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER ARE EMPLOYEES OF SIDE, RATHER THAN EMPLOYEES OF THE
FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN ADDITION TO THE DAMAGE THAT COULD BE
DONE TO ARGENTINE [REDACTED] RELATIONS BY DEFINITE EVIDENCE THAT
[REDACTED] WAS A [REDACTED] ESPIONAGE AGENT, IT WOULD BE DAMAGING TO
SIDE'S IMAGE FOR IT TO HAVE TO ADMIT THE PRESENCE OF A FOREIGN
SPY AMONG ITS PERSONNEL.)

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
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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ ~~WNINTEL~~

DIST : 9 MAY 1983

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ : CLANDESTINE RETURN OF MONTONEROS; POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS
FOR A RENEWAL OF TERRORISM

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2. AS OF EARLY MAY 1983, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MONTERO LEADERS ARE RETURNING TO ARGENTINA TO REVIEW THEIR CONTACTS AND REESTABLISH THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE ORGANIZATION. ONE WHO RETURNED RECENTLY WAS RAUL (YAGUER), THE THIRD-RANKING LEADER OF THE ORGANIZATION, WHO WAS KILLED IN CORDOBA ON 30 APRIL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MARIO (FIRMENICH), SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MONTEROS, WAS RECENTLY IN ARGENTINA.

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3. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE RETURNING MONTEROS INTEND TO INFILTRATE LABOR AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS, RATHER THAN MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR A RENEWAL OF TERRORISM. HOWEVER, THERE IS ALSO SOME CONCERN THAT THE MONTEROS MAY TRY TO RETALIATE FOR THE KILLING OF YAGUER. ONE WAY IN WHICH THEY COULD RETALIATE WOULD BE BY THE ASSASSINATION OF A PROMINENT CIVILIAN SUCH AS FORMER MINISTER OF ECONOMY JOSE (MARTINEZ DE HOZ); SUCH AN ASSASSINATION WOULD HAVE THE SECONDARY ADVANTAGE OF BEING VERY POPULAR AMONG THE LARGE NUMBERS OF ARGENTINES WHO BLAME MARTINEZ DE HOZ FOR THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS.

Argentina

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5. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CORDOBA PROVINCIAL POLICE HAD YAGUER
UNDER SURVEILLANCE FOR ABOUT TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO HIS DEATH.
DURING THAT PERIOD, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT YAGUER WAS IN REGULAR
CONTACT WITH A WOMAN WHO WAS TRAVELING BETWEEN CORDOBA AND BUENOS
AIRES. [REDACTED]

10 OF HER CONTACTS IN BUENOS AIRES WHO WERE ACTIVE MONTONEROS; IN
A COORDINATED ACTION, ALL 10 WERE DETAINED. [REDACTED]
THE 10 MONTONEROS HAVE REVEALED THAT THEY WERE PART OF A GROUP
OF ABOUT 30 MONTONERO MILITANTS WHO CLANDESTINELY RETURNED TO
ARGENTINA AND WHO HAVE BEEN ACTIVELY WORKING. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE RETURNED MONTONEROS WERE COLLECTING WEAPONS FOR A
RENEWAL OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY.

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DOMESTIC SITUATION COULD BEGIN TO DISINTEGRATE COMPLETELY,
ESPECIALLY BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF MONTONEROS WHO HAVE CLANDES-
TINELY ENTERED ARGENTINA. [REDACTED] OVER THE PAST YEARS,

[REDACTED] INTERNATIONAL LABOR MEETINGS WHERE [REDACTED] A
LARGE NUMBER OF EXILED MONTONEROS; NOW, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SOME OF THE SAME PEOPLE BACK IN BUENOS AIRES. PEREZ

[REDACTED] A NUMBER OF MONTONEROS
HAVE ALREADY INFILTRATED LABOR UNIONS AND ARE BEGINNING TO EXERT
INFLUENCE OVER THE POLITICAL ORIENTATION OF THOSE GROUPS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION TO BE VERY
SERIOUS AND [REDACTED] EXPECTS TO SEE A NEW WAVE OF TERRORISM
IN ARGENTINA.

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8. ALSO IN EARLY MAY, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] RECENT INCIDENTS IN THE PROVINCE
ARE VERY SIMILAR TO INCIDENTS CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONEROS
PRIOR TO THE BEGINNING OF THEIR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE EARLY
1970'S. FOR EXAMPLE, [REDACTED] WITHIN THE LAST
FEW WEEKS THERE HAS BEEN A RESURGENCE OF INCIDENTS IN WHICH TWO

OR THREE PERSONS STOP A POLICEMAN ON THE STREET, ASSAULT HIM, STEAL
HIS WEAPON AND AMMUNITION, AND ESCAPE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SUCH INCIDENTS ARE BEGINNING TO HAPPEN WITH ALARMING

FREQUENCY AND ARE SIMILAR TO THE WAY IN WHICH THE MONTONEROS
USED TO ACQUIRE WEAPONS. IN ADDITION, [REDACTED]

ON 29 APRIL A POLICEMAN IN THE PROVINCE WAS STOPPED, HIS WEAPON
AND AMMUNITION WERE TAKEN, HIS UNIFORM WAS TAKEN, AND HE WAS LOCKED
IN THE TRUNK OF THE ASSAILANTS' CAR. HIS ATTACKERS THEN DROVE
TO A LARGE SLAUGHTERHOUSE IN THE AREA, GAINED ENTRY BY POSING AS
POLICEMEN, TALKED THEIR WAY INTO THE OFFICES WHERE THEY STOLE ALL
THE MONEY, AND THEN LEFT IN THE CAR THAT THEY LATER ABANDONED.

[REDACTED] THIS WAS A TYPICAL WAY IN WHICH THE

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PAGE 7 [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] ~~WNINTEL~~

MONTEROS USED TO OBTAIN MONEY.

9. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE PRESENCE IN ARGENTINA OF YAGUER
PROVIDES THE FIRST CONFIRMATION [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] THAT PROMINENT MONTEROS WERE INFILTRATING
THE COUNTRY. WHETHER OR NOT THEY PLAN TO RENEW TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
CANNOT YET BE DETERMINED.)

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --WNINTEL--

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: CONSIDERATION OF ~~X~~ GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED VIOLENT ATTACKS
AGAINST CIVILIAN POLITICAL LEADERS

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PAGE 3 [REDACTED] S E C R E T [REDACTED]

WINTTEL

PREPARING ITSELF FOR THE POSSIBILITY IT WOULD RECEIVE ORDERS TO BEGIN A SERIES OF VIOLENT ATTACKS AGAINST CIVILIAN POLITICAL LEADERS IN BUENOS AIRES; [REDACTED] THE ORDER TO BEGIN THE ATTACKS COULD BE RECEIVED AS EARLY AS 6 MAY.

[REDACTED] NO OTHER INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICE WOULD BE CARRYING OUT SIMILAR ATTACKS.

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2. [REDACTED] THE PROPOSED ATTACKS WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST THE RESIDENCES OR OFFICES OF THE CIVILIAN POLITICIANS. THE ATTACKS WOULD BE CAREFULLY PLANNED TO AVOID KILLING OR HARMING ANYONE, AND THE ATTACKS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN A MANNER THAT WOULD MAKE THEM ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE MONTONERO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. [REDACTED] THE ATTACKS, IF THEY TAKE PLACE, WOULD BE AIMED AT ABOUT 10 CIVILIAN POLITICIANS, INCLUDING RAUL (CALFONSIN) AND FERNANDO ((DE LA RUA)) OF THE RADICAL CIVIC UNION (UCR), AND DEOLINDO ((BITTEL)), ANGEL ((GOBLEDO)), AND ANTONIO ((CAFIERO)) OF THE PERONIST MOVEMENT.

3. [REDACTED] GENERAL CRISTINO ((NICOLAIDES)), COMMANDER OF THE ARMY, WAS SCHEDULED TO

PAGE 4

~~SECRET~~

~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

PRESENT TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE JUNTA, FOR THEIR APPROVAL,
A PROPOSAL TO CARRY OUT THIS SERIES OF ATTACKS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE PURPOSE

OF THE ATTACKS WOULD BE TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION THAT TERRORISM
IS REVIVING IN ARGENTINA; THIS WOULD BE USED TO JUSTIFY A DECISION
OF THE JUNTA TO CANCEL PLANS FOR ELECTIONS AND RETAIN CONTROL OF
THE GOVERNMENT. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THE REASON FOR SUCH A DECISION,
IF IT SHOULD BE MADE, WOULD BE THE FEAR OF THE ARMED FORCES'
LEADERSHIP THAT A CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PRO-
TECT THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THE
MILITARY AND POLICE SERVICES FROM LEGAL CHARGES FOR EXCESSES
COMMITTED DURING THE "DIRTY WAR".)

EO25x1

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: THERE IS INDEED SERIOUS CONCERN
WITHIN THE SECURITY FORCES THAT INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS MAY BE CALLED
TO ACCOUNT FOR THEIR ACTIONS DURING THE "DIRTY WAR", AND THERE IS
ALSO SIGNIFICANT CONCERN WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP OVER
THE ALMOST TOTALLY NEGATIVE REACTION, BOTH DOMESTICALLY AND
INTERNATIONALLY, TO THE RELEASE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S "FINAL

PAGE 5

SECRET

UNRECORDED

"REPORT" ON THE "DISAPPEARED"... HOWEVER, THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION THAT THE CONCLUSION HAS BEEN REACHED, EITHER BY THE JUNTA OR BY THE COMMANDER OF THE ARMY, THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE BUT FOR THE ARMED FORCES TO MAINTAIN CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THERE IS ANOTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF PLANNED ATTACKS ON POLITICIANS TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE MONTONEROS. IN AN ATTEMPT TO FURTHER JUSTIFY THE ACTIONS TAKEN DURING THE "DIRTY WAR", ARGENTINE TELEVISION HAS BEEN REPLAYING SCENES OF TERRORIST ACTIONS THAT OCCURRED DURING THAT PERIOD. THE SERIES OF ATTACKS UNDER CONSIDERATION COULD BE PART OF A SIMILAR CAMPAIGN, DESIGNED TO REVIVE MEMORIES OF LEFTIST TERRORISM AND ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THE ARGENTINE PUBLIC THAT THE EXCESSES COMMITTED BY THE SECURITY FORCES WERE NECESSARY TO PREVENT EVEN GREATER EXCESSES AGAINST INNOCENT CIVILIANS BY TERRORISTS.)

E025x1

5. [REDACTED] COMMENT: WE BELIEVE IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT NICOLAIDES IS PRESSING FORWARD ANY PLANS FOR SUCH ATTACKS BUT IT COULD ORIGINATE AT LOWER LEVELS. ANOTHER MOTIVE BEHIND POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS TO CREATE THE IMPRESSION OF A RESURGENCE OF

PAGE 6

~~SECRET~~

~~W/INTEL~~

TERRORISM IS TO JUSTIFY RETENTION BY THE ARMED FORCES OF A
FORMAL ROLE IN MAINTAINING INTERNAL SECURITY AFTER THE ELECTED
AUTHORITIES ASSUME OFFICE IN EARLY 1984. SEVERAL LEADING
PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRANTS HAVE PROMISED TO TERMINATE MILITARY
INVOLVEMENT IN SECURITY MATTERS, AND THIS HAS BEEN ONE OF THE
PRINCIPAL DEMANDS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS.)

E025x1

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- Argentina

SECRET [REDACTED] UNCLASSIFIED

CITE: [REDACTED]

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WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ UNIMEL [REDACTED]

COUNTRY: ARGENTINA

SUBJ: ~~CLANDESTINE RETURN TO ARGENTINA OF 36 MONTONEROS;~~
~~GOVERNMENT REFUSAL TO AUTHORIZE THE RETURN OF ANY~~
MONTONERO

[REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. AS OF 18 MARCH 1983, [REDACTED]

EO25x1

[REDACTED] 36 MEMBERS OF THE MONTONERO
TERRORIST MOVEMENT HAVE CLANDESTINELY RETURNED TO ARGENTINA.

[REDACTED] THE RETURNED
MONTONEROS ARE ATTEMPTING TO INFILTRATE LABOR AND POLITICAL
ORGANIZATIONS, AND SOME MONTONEROS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN SUCCESSFUL
IN JOINING LOCAL-LEVEL PERONIST ORGANIZATIONS. THERE IS NO
INDICATION THAT THE MONTONEROS ARE MAKING PLANS FOR VIOLENT
ACTIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

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PAGE [REDACTED] ~~SECRET~~ [REDACTED] UNIMEL

2.

2. THE ARGENTINE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT AUTHORIZED THE RETURN OF
ANY MONTONERO TO ARGENTINA. THIS PROHIBITION APPLIES EQUALLY TO
FORMER HIGH-LEVEL AND LOW-LEVEL MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS AND
EXTENDS AT THIS TIME TO THOSE FORMER ACTIVISTS WHO HAVE TERMINATED
ALL ASSOCIATION WITH THE MONTONEROS.

2

3. [] COMMENT: THE PRESS HAS SPECULATED THAT SOME LOW-LEVEL

SUPPORT MEMBERS OF THE MONTONEROS MAY HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO
RETURN TO ARGENTINA. []

EO25x1

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